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COVID-19’s Impacts on the
Labor Market in 2020
Brad J. Hershbein and Harry J. Holzer
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n COVID-19 decimated the
U.S. labor market in the spring
of 2020; a partial recovery in
the summer and early fall left
historically marginalized and
economically disadvantaged
groups largely behind, more
than in any previous recession.
n Blacks and Hispanics have
had slower employment
recoveries than whites, even
accounting for differences in
education and occupation.
n States hit harder by
COVID earlier on continue
to lag behind in their
employment recovery.
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It is no secret that in the spring of 2020 the
COVID-19 pandemic disrupted U.S. labor markets
more severely and more quickly than at any point
in living memory. A blizzard of research papers,
newspaper stories, and calls for economic relief
have documented the severe crash in employment
in the spring of 2020, and the disproportionate
burden borne by workers in leisure and
accommodation, workers of color, and workers
unable to do their jobs remotely. Far less is known,
however, about how employment trajectories
have played out for diferent groups over the
rest of 2020, as a nascent recovery frst gathered
steam and then stalled, and how these patterns
varied across states that difered in the timing
and severity of their outbreaks and economic
restrictions.
In a recent working paper, we draw on publicly
available data on detailed employment measures,
COVID case rates and mortality, and state
restriction policies to shed light on how labor
markets have evolved since the pandemic began,
capturing trends through the end of 2020. We fnd
that the overall jobs recovery fatlined in October,
as caseloads and mortality rose sharply, but that
this aggregate pause obscured a continuation
of slow gains among higher-paid workers and
a second, if much milder, drop among lowerpaid workers. We also confrm that Blacks and
Hispanics not only had larger initial employment
losses in the spring, but that their employment
recoveries lagged over the summer and early fall.
Even when we control for diferences in education
and type of occupation, these racial gaps persist,
although by year’s end there was convergence for
Blacks even as the gap for Hispanics began to grow
again. Permanent job loss has also been higher
among these groups.
In addition to these disparities by race, we also
fnd large and persistent disparities in employment

trends across states. Grouping states into three
categories based on when their caseloads frst
peaked, we document that employment recoveries
have lagged among states that had the earliest
outbreaks, and that the share of their populations
with permanent job loss has increased the most.
Delving into the reasons for this dispersion,
we show that while economic restrictions hurt

Compared to prepandemic,
about 10 million more people
were jobless by December 2020,
and another 2 million had their
work hours reduced.
employment when they are in place, their negative
impact quickly fades once they are relaxed. Rather,
elevated mortality rates depress employment not
only contemporaneously but for months aferward,
most likely because a greater number of deaths is a
highly visible and persistent signal for the dangers
of engaging in economic activity that drives both
jobs and the risk of infection. Unfortunately, the
rise in mortality rates that occurred at the end of
2020 will likely create headwinds for continued
employment recovery in 2021.
To ofset these headwinds and increase the
chances that the recovery is broad and inclusive,
we propose a series of policies to provide fnancial
assistance to the workers hit hardest by the
pandemic and to help reskill workers whose
jobs are unlikely to return. However, any robust
recovery will require eforts to control the spread
of the virus in the immediate future, including
accelerated vaccination, more widespread and
inexpensive testing, and increased incentives for
mask wearing and physical distancing.
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Figure 1 Labor Market Indicators over 2020
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NOTE: The employment rate is the share of non-institutionalized civilians aged 18–64 who report being employed,
except for those who report being absent from work for unspecifed reasons (many of whom are believed by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics to have been misclassifed and are actually unemployed). The modifed employment rate
excludes individuals who report being employed part-time involuntarily. Total weekly hours is the sum of all hours
worked by people during the reference week of the survey.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations.

2020 Labor Market Trends

Figure 1 presents three indicators of
aggregate employment over the course
of 2020. Te red line with circles shows
the employment rate of people aged
18–64—the share of these people with
jobs—although we have adjusted this
number slightly to exclude individuals
who reported being absent from work
for unspecifed reasons. (Te U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics believes
many of this latter group should have
been classifed as unemployed instead.)
Starting above 75 percent prior to the
pandemic, the employment rate dips
in March before plummeting over 13
percentage points in April, gradually
recovering to 71 percent by October
and budging little over the next two
months. Nearly 10 million fewer
Americans had a job in December than
in February 2020.
However, this doesn’t capture the
full scope of the employment loss, as
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employment rate, suggesting that this
employment rate is a good proxy for
the strength of the labor market.

many workers have kept their jobs but
had their hours reduced involuntarily.
Tus, the blue line with squares
presents a modifed employment
rate that excludes individuals who
are involuntarily part time. Te gap
between this measure of employment
and the frst one is 1.5 percentage
points in January and February, but
it widens substantially by April to
4.7 percentage points, and even in
December is still 2.6 percentage points.
Tis means that, in addition to the
approximately 10 million fewer people
without a job, another 2 million are
employed but working fewer hours
than before the pandemic. Finally,
the dashed black line shows the total
number of hours worked per week
across all Americans. Tis metric
has fallen from 5.6 billion in early
2020 to 5.15 billion as of December, a
decline of 8.4 percent, about the same
percentage decline as the modifed

Tis overall recovery, anemic as
it is, has not been felt equally by all
workers. Te two panels in Figure 2
break out trends by occupational wage
quartile. Each quartile represents a
fourth of workers based on the average
hourly wage in their occupation, with
1 being the lowest and 4 being the
highest. Panel A shows the modifed
employment rate, as in Figure 1.
Although lower wage quartiles have
always had lower employment rates,
the gap surged afer the pandemic
began. Te modifed employment rate
of the frst wage quartile plummeted
by an astonishing 35 percentage points
between February and April, before
rebounding about two-thirds of the
way back by October. Workers in
higher wage quartiles sufered much
smaller losses, with those in the top
quartile down only 2 percentage
points from the beginning of 2020
by year’s end, and those in the third
quartile down 6 percentage points.
While modifed employment rates
continued to rise slightly between
November and December for the top
two wage quartiles, they reversed
course and fell slightly for the bottom
two quartiles. Tese losses occurred
simultaneously with rising COVID
caseloads and mortality and renewed
economic restrictions, particularly in
the hospitality and leisure sector, which
has many low-paying occupations.
Panel B in Figure 2 examines the
share of the population who report
sufering permanent job loss (that is,
they lost a job and do not consider
themselves on temporary layof).
Research has found that such longterm job separation predicts lower
earnings and higher health risks even
decades later (Ruhm 1991; Eliason and
Storrie 2006; Sullivan and Von Wachter
2009). In winter 2020, these shares
clustered around half a percent for all
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wage quartiles. Tey rose sharply and
diverged, particularly over the summer
and fall, with the share peaking at 3.2
percent in October for the bottom
quartile. Te slight dips seen in
December are not necessarily good
news—because modifed employment
rates also fell for the bottom quartiles
(panel A), it’s likely that workers in the
bottom quartile were leaving the labor
force entirely rather than fnding a new
job.

Recovery Lags for Black and
Hispanic Workers

Te recovery in the modifed
employment rate has also varied
considerably by race and ethnicity.
Te solid red and blue lines in Figure
3 show the change in the employment
rate, in percentage points, for Blacks
and Hispanics since January 2020.
Hispanics initially fare the worst,
but Blacks also sufer greater initial
losses than other racial groups (solid
gray line). Hispanics have also had a
faster recovery, at least into the fall. By
December, racial gaps had narrowed,
especially for Blacks, although there
was some slippage for Hispanics.
Some of these racial gaps may be
due to education and occupational
diferences. Tus, in the dashed lines,
we statistically control for these
diferences. Tis reduces the gap
substantially between Blacks and
everyone else in the spring and early
summer, but plays a somewhat smaller
role aferward. Tese adjustments make
less of a diference for the gap with
Hispanics. Tus, not only have Blacks
and Hispanics had larger employment
losses and slower recoveries, the
bulk of these disparities—especially
for Hispanics—cannot be explained
by educational and occupational
diferences.

The Role of COVID Mortality and
Economic Restrictions
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Figure 2 The Bottom Wage Quartile Has Had a Much Weaker Recovery Than the Top Quartile
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. The permanent job loser share is the
share of the population (not just the unemployed) who report having lost a job and do not expect to be recalled.
The (hourly) wage quartiles are based on detailed occupation from Occupational Employment Statistics and are
population weighted; Q1 thus represents the bottom quarter of workers in terms of hourly pay, while Q4 represents
the top quarter.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.

Employment rate losses and
recoveries also difer across states. We
fnd, for example, that states that had

3
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Figure 3 Blacks and Hispanics Have Experienced Slower Employment Rate Recoveries, Even after
Adjusting for Education and Occupation
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. Light, solid lines show the change, in
percentage points, of the modifed employment rate since January 2020 for each racial group. The darker, dashed lines
control for worker education and occupational wage quartile.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.

initial COVID-19 caseload peaks in
the spring of 2020—the well-known
New York and New Jersey, but also
Minnesota, Virginia, and Colorado—
had deeper declines and less robust
recoveries than states that reached
their frst caseload peak only in the fall,
such as New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
and Oregon. A key question is how
COVID caseload and mortality
rates, as well as state restrictions on
economic activity—including stayat-home orders and bans on indoor
dining, among others—have afected
employment. Using regression analysis,
we fnd that current case rates are
positively associated with employment,
while current mortality rates and
the severity of current economic
restrictions reduce employment rates.
Tis likely refects the short-run tradeof between heightened economic
activity and greater virus transmission
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when there are fewer restrictions.
However, we also fnd that there
are no lingering efects of economic
restrictions; once these are relaxed,
the employment rate bounces back.
On the other hand, we do fnd an
accumulating impact of COVID
mortality (but not caseloads) on
employment rates. By December, a
state with 100 more total deaths per
100,000 people—about the diference
between the 90th percentile (Rhode
Island; 131.8 deaths per 100,000
people) and the 10th percentile (Utah;
28.6 deaths per 100,000)—would be
expected to have an employment rate
3 percentage points lower, everything
else equal. Te surge in mortality rates
that occurred nationwide in November
2020 through January 2021 thus could
pose a looming threat to continued
economic recovery in 2021.

Conclusion

Te labor market recovery from
the COVID-19 recession was brief
and uneven in 2020, leaving behind
workers disadvantaged by race,
ethnicity, and economic status. As
cases ebb and fow around the country,
states that have sufered—or will
sufer—numerous COVID deaths
may experience a slower recovery
through 2021. An equitable and
broad economic recovery will need
a rapid and comprehensive vaccine
rollout, but we argue in the paper
for several additional policies to
spur employment. Tese should
include fscal relief for state and local
governments to stave of further cuts,
wage insurance programs for those
who struggle to fnd new jobs, and
enhanced funding for sectoral training
and community college education for
industries and occupations that will
continue to grow, such as construction,
health care, and IT.
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